General David Petraeus - The United States Should Have a Permanent Footprint in Afghanistan

In today's special episode, Secretary Shulkin and Lou are joined by General David Petraeus. General Petraeus served Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and before retiring from a 37 year Army career, served as the Commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and Commander, U.S. Forces – Afghanistan. He speaks to the tragedy that is occurring in Afghanistan, and provides words of encouragement to veterans who are struggling with the U.S. Withdrawal.

Transcript

General David Petraeus: 0:02

Any veteran, certainly most are sad to see what has happened. To see all that so many works so hard and sacrifice so much to achieve. You know, people ask me, How do you? How do you see this? I say it's heartbreaking. It's tragic. In some respects it's disasters. But at the end of the day, I don't come back to what an Afghan actually wrote to me and said, I can't thank you enough for all the opportunities, freedoms, and the privileges that we enjoyed during the time of the US and coalition forces. commitment to our country. This group of Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America, they comprise the new greatest generation of Americans, and they should stay quietly proud of what it is that they did in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Announcer: 1:08

Welcome to the policy beds podcast, engaging with leaders, scholars and strong voices to fill a void in support of policy development for America's veterans, with your hosts, former Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Dr. David shulkin, and former executive director of the American Legion Louis Celli. Today's guest is General David Petraeus, General Petraeus served as the director of the Central Intelligence Agency. And before retiring from a 37 year army career served as the commander of the International Security Assistance Force, and commander US forces Afghanistan.

Louis Celli: 1:46

Mr. Secretary, in light of all this happening in Afghanistan, and, you know, the bombings at the at the Kandahar airport, I think it's important that we do this special edition podcast and just get this out as soon as possible.

Dr. David Shulkin: 2:02

Yeah, Lou, I couldn't agree more. I think having General David Petraeus as our guest is really the right way to do this. Because so many people are watching the events as they unfold with absolute horror and so many people upset but there's probably nobody better in my opinion, then David Petraeus to really explain to people about what we've been doing in Afghanistan, what the implications of what we're seeing on TV, our I couldn't agree more,

Louis Celli: 2:38

the United States is glued to this news. As a matter of fact, our recent podcast with with former ambassador Roy Romani has so far received one of the most downloads of all of the podcasts that we've ever done.

Dr. David Shulkin: 2:55

Yeah, I think people want to hear from people who have been there who have been live the experience know the Afghani people know, the impact of this. And I think that's what we're going to hear from General Petraeus today.

Louis Celli: 3:08

You know, it's such a complex situation, we went into Iraq to combat terrorism, then we moved into Afghanistan to unseat the Taliban because they were providing safe haven to to al Qaeda and, and the Islamic State extremists. They were training and indoctrinating fighters. And, you know, I think that people forget that Osama bin Laden didn't just show up on September 11, that he was an international fugitive, he was a terrorist leader, you know, that he was wanted for the bombings of the US Embassy in 1998.

Dr. David Shulkin: 3:38

You know, what's so hard is, is that when you think about these 13 servicemen and women who lost their lives in this latest, horrible terrorist attack than all of the 2500, others whose gave the ultimate sacrifice over Afghanistan, most of them were not even born during the 911 bombings. And I think you're going to hear when you listen to General Petraeus, that to really understand Afghanistan, you have to understand the history that has gone back over centuries, the culture that's there. And understanding of this really helps us think about what the future of Afghanistan is going to be and ultimately what the threats are going to be to our homeland.

Louis Celli: 4:28

One of the things I was really happy that he helped clarify, was what our mission was to be in Afghanistan in the first place. What will we therefore was it nation building? How long had we planned on being there? When was it that we thought that we would be able to pull out if ever and I just thought that was really valuable?

Dr. David Shulkin: 4:48

And the other thing I think is going to be really important for people to hear is he believes this was absolutely predictable, the events that were going to happen. He understood that Not only is this a policy failure, but he talks about the human impact on veterans. And he talks about the long lasting consequences to our foreign policy, and the influence that some of our competitors, some may even see future combatants are going to have in terms of influence in that area of the world. And all of this means that what we're seeing now is just a piece of a story that's going to continue to play out for future generations of Americans.

Louis Celli: 5:40

And General Petraeus does not pull any punches. He doesn't side with Democrats or Republicans or any of the administration's he had, he had criticisms and compliments for many of the administration's going back, really, back to the time that that he commanded us forces in Afghanistan.

Dr. David Shulkin: 6:00

I think the reason so many people respect General Petraeus. And if you talk to our troops that he commanded, they absolutely adore this guy, because he doesn't play politics. And of course, I work with them closely on the board of the Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America. And I've just gotten to know Him not as taking political positions, but really being a very thoughtful policy person. So why don't we stop here and give General Petraeus a chance to explain this to all of our listeners,

Louis Celli: 6:38

I think that our listeners are going to be very well informed after the end of this podcast. Right. Well, General Petraeus, thank you so much for taking the time to join us on the policy. That's podcast it. It's an honor to have you, sir. And I, I know that our listeners have been waiting for this type of update on Afghanistan all week.

Dr. David Shulkin: 7:05

General Petraeus. Thanks so much for being with us today. Thanks. Thanks for all you've done for our veterans over the years. These are truly extraordinary times that we're living through, we're seeing new developments almost every hour coming out of Afghanistan. Can you give our listeners a sense of the strategic objectives that we've had in Afghanistan over the past 20 years? Many people believe that our objective was to capture Osama bin Laden, which of course we did in 2011 and killed him, and thought maybe that that was the end of our strategic objective in Afghanistan. But can you give our listeners your sense about what we were trying to accomplish there?

General David Petraeus: 7:57

Sure. Again, we went to Afghanistan, because that is where the 911 attack for plan when al Qaeda had a sanctuary in eastern Afghanistan under Taliban rule, the Taliban refused to expel him. And so we went in and eliminated that sanctuary. Tragically, at that time, sort of bin Laden got away. We also obviously had to topple the government that was essentially sheltering him the Taliban control government, which was ruling in Afghanistan at that time, in sort of a seventh century, ultra conservative interpretation of Islam. We stayed to ensure that al Qaeda could not reestablish the kind of sanctuary that they enjoyed over the Taliban. And we also stayed to continue to use Afghanistan as a platform for the regional counterterrorism campaign, the most prominent example of which was the raid launch from Afghanistan, Bhagavad Pakistan, to bring Osama bin Laden to justice and then ended back in Afghanistan. In fact, that happened to be in the final few months of my time as the commander in Afghanistan before going to the CIA. We've stayed beyond that, of course, because we wanted to be able to draw down our forces in a manner that did not lead to the country collapsing and once again being being either on governed or governed by a regime that might welcome our kind of back on its soil. And that meant that you had to do some nation building again, your interpretations that well, it all became futile when we started to try to do nation building. We didn't go there to do nation building. We went there again, for the reasons that I stated we stayed for the reasons that I stated, but we had to do nation building because if you don't build host nation capacity and capability In the security forces area in a variety of other critical institutions, you literally can't draw down without the place collapsing around you. And frankly, we were able to do that with a reasonable degree of success, obviously, until the recent withdraw. During my time again, we initiated the actual transition of some tasks and select districts all based on conditions on the ground, and certain institutions that continued over the subsequent basically, quite a decade. And it reached the point where, of course, it was the Afghans who were doing the fighting on the frontlines, keep in mind that over 66,000 of them died fighting for their country, that's 27 times or so our losses in Afghanistan, and generally running the country, albeit with a fair amount of financial assistance from the United States, Japan, UK, a handful of other of the coalition partners and donor nations around the world. And that's where it was until the previous administration negotiated an agreement and essentially, so that we could leave force the Afghan government which we didn't even allow to sit at the table and the negotiations over their country's future, force that government to release 5000 Taliban detainees did get an assurance from the Taliban that they would not directly target our forces. But we weren't on the frontlines at that point in time. Anyway, we were providing advise, assist and enable the enabling beam, drones precision, air attack, and intelligence fusion as our coalition partners carried out the train and equip mission, keeping Monday, two to three times as many coalition members as US forces on the ground at the end. And committed to a certain withdrawal date. This particular administration announced that it would carry out that withdrawal agreement I'll be a little bit later than the agreed date. And tragically, as we saw, the withdrawal of our forces, the psychological impact really of that the psychological impact of withdrawal of our air power, and the ability to employ that airpower. And then the withdrawal of a 500 coalition forces and some 17 or 18,000, contractors have kept the Afghan Air Force operational, the most crucial element to assure Afghan soldiers out in these different front lines that somebody had their back, somebody would bring reinforcements, Errol medivac, emergency resupply and precision attack that eroded in its readiness, its capability because of the withdrawal of the contractors who kept the very sophisticated us systems operational. And the result, I think, somewhat predictably, was that you saw after fighting for a few days, in some cases much longer. For example, on helmet there was a month long fight going on. But at a certain point, after we withdrew the coalition and the contractors with through Afghan forces all around were under simultaneous attacks, launched by the Taliban, quite a skillful offensive, and recognize that there's nobody coming to the rescue, nobody had their backs, there's no air support. And they did what Afghans have always done, which is cut deals, and local commanders and local political leaders did just that, all the way up to the point that the President can understand, left as well. And again, this is you know, it's it's a heartbreaking development, especially for the Afghan citizens, you see how many hundreds of 1000s of them want to leave the country don't want to live once again, under the Taliban, which may not take them all the way back to the seventh century, but certainly is going to govern, as they say, in accordance with Sharia law. We're not sure what that means precisely, in all cases, whether women will be able to go to college school, participate in the economy and so forth, have any freedoms outside the home. But again, many, many Afghans clearly don't want to live under that system. Once again. It's a tragic development and security respects. We use the spectacular basis we had at Bagram and Kandahar and so forth, which were not just very, very helpful for ensuring that al Qaeda and now also the Islamic State, and of course, it was the Islamic State that carried out the terrible tragic bombing at the airfield gate that killed so many of our soldiers and even many, many more Afghans in just sad to see the accomplishments the achievements of some 20 years, however imperfect that Afghan government may have been, however, frustrating certain elements of the way it operated the Corps. option and all the rest. Despite all of that, clearly, that was preferable an ally and a partner, at the very least in the fight against al Qaeda in the Islamic State, and preferable to the Taliban. But again, we are where we are. Our country has carried out a very impressive airlift. No one should ever doubt the capacity of us transportation command, in the air on the ground at sea. And we've seen a demonstration of that, despite extraordinary challenges and terrorist threats and terrorist attacks. And all the issues that have been been a feature of the landscape over the last couple of weeks as we approach the date by which all of our forces, and apparently all of our diplomats are going to pull out of Afghanistan.

Dr. David Shulkin: 15:51

General Petraeus. That was a very comprehensive and thoughtful analysis of the whole situation. But you said some things I just wanted, in a, in a short way, follow up on to make sure that I heard correctly. So the first thing when you talked about the policy objectives of the United States and the United States military, it sounds to me like the current status quo before we pulled out was being successful in keeping our policy objectives in place. In other words, making sure that the Taliban and other terrorist groups like ISIS Kay, didn't take control the country, do you think that there was anything wrong with continuing to keep the troops at the current levels in place, and that withdrawal was a mistake?

General David Petraeus: 16:46

Well, for years, so the previous for three administrations actually that what we should have is a, what I've termed a sustained, sustainable connected sustainability measured in terms of the expenditure of blood treasure associated with that particular commitment of our forces, diplomats, development workers, all the other elements that are part of the overarching civil military effort in Afghanistan. You do have to acknowledge and I think the President has been correct in saying that, number one, the Taliban would have launched a bunch of attacks, they would have perhaps gone after us in a way that they had not before, whether that would have been successful or not as debatable since we were in the command centers, the headquarters, the Afghan forces, were in the training bases, and so forth, not on the front lines. Again, it's the Afghans who have been doing fighting on the frontlines, and they have been fighting hard and dying and very substantial numbers, as I noted earlier, but the security situation, how do you wrote it is a fact it's possible that we might have needed who knows if 1000 or 2000, more than what we had. But again, they would not be on the front lines. And the biggest contribution, which is made possible by the extraordinary proliferation of this armada of drones that we have, that really is what has made the difference. And it's enabled us in other situations as well. For example, we enabled, we didn't do we enabled the Iraqi security forces to eliminate the ISIS Caliphate in northern Iraq, we enabled the Syrian Democratic Forces to eliminate the ISIS Caliphate and northeastern Syria, we took very, very few casualties in those operations. Because their forces host nation forces were on the front lines, we provided close air support. In some cases, we provided artillery, other precision munitions, and so forth. Intelligence very, very important, because we have a unique ability to piece together disparate data and make sense out of it. So I'd like to think that that was very much possible in Afghanistan. It is something that again, that I recommended publicly for a number of years. I do think that alternative was possible. It's certainly conceivable, as the President suggested that the fighting would intensify that the that there would be a need for some additional forces, but I can't imagine that it would have been a vast number of forces is really again about the enablers that we are providing. And keep in mind that as long as we were there, the coalition was there so they could do the training and equipping again, about 8500 of them to are between 20 530 500 and they wanted to stay. And of course, you also had, therefore one of the large number of contractors who were essential to the maintenance and the operational readiness of the Afghan Air Force, which is the first line of enablers, which we then supplement, when it's clear that they can't provide everything that is needed. ticular fight in a particular part of a very vast country where airpower is absolutely essential, because the road structure, as you know, is very limited. The country is very mountainous, the security of roads can be cut and all the rest of that. So, again, that would have been an alternative. Certainly, that was one that was put forward, it's publicly known by Manor on the ground regional commander and those in the Pentagon as an option. Again, President made a policy decision and soldiers do and soldiers always do, which is to salute and implement the policy does it as I did, I mean, it wasn't every time I made a recommendation that it was accepted, or embraced by the President. And as I announced in different times of Congress, where you're required to give your best professional military advice. So it was, I said, for example, I fully support the decision in president united states, we'll do everything we can to continue to accomplish the mission with resources provided, as a result of this decision, it was, say a more aggressive formulation of the drawdown than I recommended, but again, that that is how our system rightly works. And that is how we have arrived at where we are implementing the policy, which is essentially full withdrawal of US forces. And it appears US diplomats, which also implies that US intelligence elements, at the very least have been dramatically reduced in many of their platforms, if you will, and different elements and so forth, will have also had to be drawn down.

Louis Celli: 21:42

General, thank you for that. And I want to I want to take you back now to to something you said about training the Afghan forces so in, in, in your opinion, because it it would appear from, from the the media reports that we're getting here in the United States that, that maybe the Afghan forces weren't trained as well as they could have been, but they were in fact trained and would have been able to be self sufficient, provided they knew that they had the support of the allied nations, either the United States or not just the United States, but the whole coalition forces is, is that what you're saying?

General David Petraeus: 22:21

Well, look, there are always ways in which we can improve train, you're always looking back and asking perhaps we should have done those, perhaps we should have done that. I mean, at one point, in fact, when I was the command, this was mine years into our time in Afghanistan was only them, and not because I was there was really more attributable to what General McChrystal, the commander before me did. There was only at that point that we for the first time in Afghanistan and actually had the inputs, right. And we were still tweaking them by inputs. I mean, the right roughly the right number of forces almost right number of other resources, diplomats, development workers rule of law, funding, intelligence, all the other components of a comprehensive civil military campaign, the right organizational architecture, we screwed that up badly, in the very beginning, just read the book A Good Day to Die in, there are consequences for not having that right, ie Osama bin Laden got away in the Tora Bora operation. That's one of the results of that. We first were preparing our forces Finally, the right way, we had arguably the right leaders and experience in the understanding really for the last nine years. So there's always improvements that can and should be made. While I was the commander, we actually decided on something was pretty profound, which is, you know, what we have to actually give Afghan recruits basic skills education before we can actually give them basic military training. Because they couldn't read they couldn't write many of them, some of them so at least we had to test and determine who needed to understand how to do numbers. I do rudimentary math, rudimentary again, reading and writing. Because if you can't read a license plate number that's given to you on a bolo Be on the lookout list, obviously, you're not going to be a very effective traffic control point. Participants. So again, you get the idea here. And of course, keep in mind that they're fighting as in a sense as of professional horses is not a force deliberately that is motivated by religious zeal or some particular religious political ideology, as well, that is just it's a reality, whether it's a constraint or what have you. So that is what you do. And again, in a country like that, you have to have forces that can reinforce very rapidly in fact, there was a 30,000 man, and actually some women as well over time Afghan Special Operations force component that would in fact, go to the rescue on the Blackhawk helicopter see 130 aircraft and then be supported by the world. attack helicopters and the fixed wing attack aircraft as well. Again, undoubtedly, there are innumerable aspects that could have been improved that were improved along the way. You're always trying to learn trying to make changes that will be sensible, and, and help. But at the end of the day, it really was a psychological issue, the lack of anyone having their back and the awareness of that by Afghan forces, that led them to do what Afghans have always done over the course of many millennia, as different empires and countries and forces have swept across their land, which is to understand when the wind is shifting, and it's now blowing from a different direction and accommodating that reality. Now, some have called this concept professional chameleons. But clearly, there was not an option for them. If nothing else is coming to the rescue, look for the taller bond concentrates more for horses on individual locations all around the country. And keep in mind, by the way that the number 300,000 is thrown around is the Afghan security force. That's not the army. Half of that might be the actual army, the rest is all police. We're, we're customers in a whole variety of different security forces, at least half of which aren't really on the frontlines. They're actually in a variety of other capacities as any nation's security forces are. It really was when they realize no us really is going Oh, that started again to the previous administration signing, again, an agreement that I think is was very, very unhelpful. It then the the announcement in this administration, then the actual withdrawal, which then followed by the withdrawal of the coalition forces, and then they withdraw the contractors. And then they look around the country. And they realize the whole country is under attack, nobody's coming to the rescue. And there became an epidemic of essentially surrender. We're cutting deals, all the way through which culminates all the way with the president flying out of the country, and seeking refuge and sell. This was somewhat more than somewhat predictable. And in fact, some of us months ago did say, the contractors are withdrawn, and the Afghan Air Force can't respond. We need to look out when that happens. And that did happen. And that's when the collapse started to occur.

Dr. David Shulkin: 27:36

General Petraeus that just wanted to go back to some of the things that you said in terms of many of us were surprised that President Ghani left his country so early. And, you know, I think that that was a huge psychological blow. We had met with President Ghani on his last trip when he was here to Washington about six weeks ago. And it was somewhat clear to me in talking to him, that there was really very little communication and coordination between our country and his government at that point. And you had mentioned that in your earlier comments that that coordination was far from ideal. Do you do you have a perspective on why we weren't in better alignment with his government and whether we could have prevented some of what you're calling this predictable collapse?

General David Petraeus: 28:33

Well, there were efforts to guide the government to pull its forces in you remember at that dinner that we attended with them, President Ghani and his vice president and others, there were suggestions made to you, you can't protect the entire country without the us there. You need to construct the defense's find natural lines that can be defended, that must be defended, you're not going to be able to defend every provincial capital, it's going to be tough decisions. And frankly, there were not decisions forthcoming that responded to that, based on the reports that we now have of the final weeks and final days of that particular government. There's no telling whether they could have held out longer if that had been the case, especially once the Air Force was no longer capable of responding the way that did early on, or the way it did when the contractors were there. That that was just a part of the reality. And of course, he then really surprised his own government leaving without actually telling them and just one you know, the final few will deal or withdraw or just departure and that one a little bit harder to predict. But again, That's something that he'll have to address.

Louis Celli: 30:02

General, the event are literally unfolding, a we're speaking, as we're eve having this broadcast. And, yo know, between between th bombings that are now happening you know, not only to American but also to the Taliban. Right So everyone is now under attac by somebody else. After we no have have pulled out and afte we will have finished pullin out

General David Petraeus: 30:27

What does that look like? As a former economics professor, I learned long ago that you can never go wrong by saying it depends. On it does depend depends on how well the Taliban negotiate with those groups that might be inclined to continue to fight them. There is the Vice President, for example, and the son of Ahmed Shah Massoud who are in the puncher Valley, which was one of the historic areas the Taliban never did control during their previous time, ruling Afghanistan in the mid late 1990s. Do they negotiate with them? Can they be inclusive? There are others so called northern warlords in groups, keeping in mind that the Taliban are largely posh too often. And those tribes and can they accommodate the party whose back turkman, carry all the other again, Hazara. And so foreclosures are with some support, at least from Iran, given that they're a Shia group that has often been oppressed in Afghanistan and attacked, in fact, as ISIS has done in the past, we believe, and then, so can they get as many people inside the tent as as possible. So the only ones outside the tent might actually end up being the Islamic State orizon Group, which reportedly carried out this terrible attack at the airfield, and you know, what can they do about all kinds of keep them off their soil. So again, it very much depends on how the Afghans actually are going to govern. And no one really can predict that just yet, only time will tell whether they revert to the seventh century or the 13th, or the 18th, or whatever century. And now in his terms, and also, of course, they are facing an extraordinary fiscal challenge, but they literally have no money. This is a country that imports, electricity imports, refined fuel products, imports, many, many goods and services, they run a billions of dollars, current account, trade deficit every year. That difference typically is made up by funding from the US, Japan, UK and a number of other coalition donor nations. And that is, at the very least for the time being frozen their assets and around the world are frozen. There's special drawing rights from the IMF that we're going to provide our $450 million to Afghanistan in the weeks ahead, are on hold. So literally, how do they keep the lights on in Kabul? banks are essentially rationing, what can be withdrawn? People can't get their money out of them. The ATMs aren't working. So how does the country actually operate? How does its economy go forward? Those are questions that no one right now is able to answer because again, we don't know what the nature of the Taliban rule will be. And if they are an exceedingly oppressive, once again, ultra conservative version of Sharia law. And there will be a number of those donor nations, where domestic political reasons If nothing else, that will find it very difficult to provide funding. On the other hand, you could have a more optimistic version of what they might be more inclusive, more open tent, more tolerant, more whatever. In which case, perhaps because they're the enemy of our enemy, the Islamic State, now being the crossers, most prominently because of the horrific, barbaric murder 13 of our great men and women in uniform and weigh over 100 Afghan citizens. Again, that could be some alternative approach. And we may not like the nature of their rural women may not be able to enjoy the freedoms I'm sure they will not that they had under the Afghan government, however imperfect and they have been there will not be the freedoms. I don't think that Afghanistan has gotten used to over the last 20 years and for which the people actually are quite thankful to have even experienced that for two decades. Then of course, you see hundreds of 1000s of Afghans probably billions All told, voting with their feet which gives you some indication of how they think the situation is going To turn out and they are refugees now and neighboring countries Pakistan most significantly, or, again, in the United States, already third countries, what have you, again, well over 100,000, having been evacuated just by this airlift of all different types, not just us over the course of the last few weeks. So, again, it does depend. And a great deal is riding on how the the Taliban actually govern Afghanistan, and the nature of their rule as to whether or not the economy can even continue, or if it just sort of seizes up, and it becomes a true humanitarian disaster of quite considerable terms. And that prospect is very much there.

Dr. David Shulkin: 35:52

I think that given what you described about the potential for real instability in Afghanistan, do you worry that that opens up the door for much greater influence from countries that are competing with the united states such as the Chinese influence?

General David Petraeus: 36:11

Well, certainly the Chinese have always sought access to Afghanistan's incredible mineral wealth, we estimated in $2 trillion. When I happened to be the commander there, whatever it may be, it is vast. There. There's stores of lithium, for example, that you can get out into the ground with a shovel. There are rare earths or all the hard minerals, again, in China has vast needs for this and has gone all around the world trying to get access to them. So that's a natural, and we should expect that and of course, they are a neighbor, they share a sliver of finger land that comes out from Northeastern Afghanistan, and connects into the Chinese location, Shin john, which was also the where the Muslim Uyghurs are. And so China's very first objective is to make sure that Islamist extremism does not emanate from Afghanistan, into China, they have been very, very concerned about that for a number of years and taken a number of measures to combat that. But if they can get access in the security situation permits it, they will be very aggressive investors in Afghanistan, they did have a copper mine, south of Kabul, again, when I was the commander, there were some mortars shot, presumably by the Taliban, or the economy network of the Taliban and affiliate, quite murders. And they left. So again, they're not going to go in with security forces, I don't think but they may go in with investment, dollars or Remondi. But again, it's not easy. You have very limited human capital, very limited physical capital, very limited lines of communication, infrastructure, and so forth, will take a great deal and to build that up. So that's not going to be something and I don't think they're just going to write a blank check. And say, don't worry about it. Here's whatever you need to keep yourselves in food, fuel, electricity, and so forth in the short term, and in the long term would like to have access to your minerals, there may be some of that to be sure. And some of that would be understandable. Russia could conceivably have some interest in that regard. They don't have the same level of resources. And their concern is really more about not having the Central Asian states, which are their former Russian republics be a source of militancy. They also have concerns about Islamist extremists, they're very concerned about the illegal narcotics that flow out of Afghanistan, that's the one new source of revenue that the Taliban will have, because they've essentially run the entire Poppy, planting, harvesting, opium production, etc. that then is exported through a variety of different countries around Ghana standard Iran among the Central Asian states, and others. So that source of revenue, but again, that can't be can't be more than a billion dollars a year. At most in the good old days, Afghanistan could generate at most 2 billion in revenue from customs duties, and some taxes, that doesn't begin to fill the many, many millions or billions of dollars that they need, again, just to satisfy their trade deficit. Historically, much less pay their security forces, salaries, we paid by their operating expenses, food, fuel, and so forth, in all the other government workers just for starters, so they're in for a very, very tough time. They've already gotten turkey in Got her to agree to at least help them keep the airport going. Because again, they will have air traffic control a variety of other capacities and capabilities that are needed. It's it could be a pretty grim period going forward. And as I said, it is by no means inconceivable that this could be an absolute humanitarian catastrophe. And again, we obviously will be very, very concerned for our former partners, the Afghan citizens and just follow human beings in that situation. But obviously, there will be limits to what countries like the United States and others can and will do, depending on the nature of the Taliban rule.

Dr. David Shulkin: 40:40

It's pretty clear that the Taliban has upgraded their public relations capabilities they've they've, they're presenting themselves as if it is a new and different Taliban than we've seen in the past. Is there any evidence to suggest that there might be some hope here for for a different level of governing under a Taliban regime?

General David Petraeus: 41:06

Well, again, the sensitivity at the very least to their image is very different from the past. You'll recall from the past that their soccer fields are basically used for executions, and for examples to the Afghan people, and quite barbaric. carriage of justice, if you will. So again, it began, that's not inconceivable one can actually envision I don't know how realistic it is to expect it, though. And again, only time will tell it completely depends on who it is, it ends up leading the dollar on how inclusive they are, whether they can negotiate deals with the potential groups that could continue to fight them, and how, how then they can attract capital, and attract humanitarian assistance, because they're going to be in a very, very dismal situation. I

Louis Celli: 42:08

hear General Petraeus taking into consideration the strategic value of the mineral rights. The the fact that that humanitarian aid is is absolutely going to be paramount. On on a great many Americans minds fighting the drug war, share with our listeners, what we should do, how long should we have been there? Should we have ever pulled out?

General David Petraeus: 42:33

Well, we have been in a number of countries around the world, albeit not countries at war, the way Afghanistan was, but I mean, look at Korea, way beyond 70 years. And again, keep in mind that that country was not the extraordinary country introduced today, for a number of decades. In fact, the rulers of that country for quite some time were former generals, there was a degree of corruption and other practices that were of grave concern. Look, our own country. Let's not remember that some seven years, more than seven years after our own country, declared its independence, experienced a bloody brutal civil war. Again, it takes decades many, many more than two decades to take a country from the seventh century into the 21st century. It is legitimate to be frustrated, to decry to be, you know, just experienced maddening issues, but it does take a degree of sustained but sustainable commitment in such situations, but that's, you know, that decision has been made. That can be re litigated by historians, for years and decades to come. The question is, what do we do now? I do wonder whether we should not at least seriously consider keeping the embassy open. Apparently, we I think we are going to evacuate everyone. That's the latest report. And I'm not sure that we shouldn't maintain some presence there for a whole variety of reasons. And that becomes then, you know, it's literally a walk to the presidential palace now occupied by the Taliban and might be an option, a window on what's going on that will be more difficult to obtain from neighboring countries, keeping in mind that none of them are likely to allow us to have bases on their soil. Pakistanis have said that will not be possible. The Central Asian states have not responded positively. Certainly Iran is not going to allow us to have a base so this is going to be quite difficult. So called offshore intelligence collection, flying drones and manned aircraft out of bases in the Gulf states, that's a long flight, especially for a slow flying drone, you could consume 60% of its flight time just getting to and from Afghanistan rather than the unblinking eye kind of orbit that we have gotten used to when we had bases in Afghanistan from which we could fly these different platforms. And for the fighter bombers, it's going to take a fleet of aerial refueling tankers to keep them in the air and keep them over Afghanistan when we need to do that. So again, this, there's nothing easy about what lies ahead. There will be a lot of different options explore. Everyone has been quite clear about that publicly. But the director of the CIA, Ambassador, Bill Burns, I have enormous respect and worked in a number of different capacities over the years, has been very forthright, saying he will be much tougher, if without basis on the ground. So again, I'm sure that they're looking hard at the potential for reoccupying. That embassy, I'm not sure what the conditions that they've laid out, are. But that certainly will be something to examine, as we get down the road. I mean, we have embassies in most countries, just about every country around the world with a couple of exceptions, even those that are either actual or potential adversaries. So that is certainly something I'm sure that will be examined very closely by the national security team at the Bible administration in the weeks and months ahead.

Dr. David Shulkin: 46:34

General Petraeus just before we finish up here, I wanted to ask you, about veterans, and both you and I serve on the board of the Iraq and Afghanistan veterans. And over the past, you know, couple weeks, we've been hearing from so many veterans about their own experience and the way that they're impacted by watching these scenes on television and by the withdrawl. And I just wondered, you were the commander of these forces for so long in Afghanistan. How is this impacting you? And how are you feeling about your time that you spent there in the so many people that were under your command that made the ultimate sacrifice? Are you feeling that all that was worth it? And, and or is this been a very tough time for you as well?

General David Petraeus: 47:34

Well, I think that for many of those who served in Afghanistan, I should note our son searches a rival the Tomb Raider, on 73rd, airborne when I was the commander, in fact, outside the wire, getting shot out periodically, and so forth. Our daughter in law served with a 1/73 airborne in Afghanistan, it was one of their female engagement, team members and so forth. Look, I think any veteran, certainly most are sad to see what has happened, we felt that we were providing the Afghans really a somewhat unique opportunity. Again, their government was imperfective. They're imperfect, their institutions were imperfect. But nonetheless, they had opportunities that they had clearly not enjoyed under the dollar. But my wife and I sponsor a woman at the American University of Afghanistan, thankfully, she's been gotten out to Doha, Qatar, and is already hard at work. But, again, I don't know how you cannot be sad, even if you were keenly aware of the challenges and the issues, again, the corruption and other characteristics of a government that made it very, very maddening. And clearly, you know, the loss the to see all that so many work so hard and sacrifice so much to achieve. And the sacrifice of the Afghans who apply for their country, the coalition forces. You can't look at this and see an all swept away in a matter of really, it's a few months or even a few weeks, and not be I think, deeply saddened, right. You know, people ask me, how do you how do you see this? I say it's heartbreaking. It's tragic. Some respects it's disastrous. I mean, I don't know how you can describe the replacement of a government that was an ally, and a partner again, however, flawed by the Taliban group that we fought for 20 years. The group that allowed are kinda on its soil. When 911 attacks are planned. There has to be I think, this last as disasters, but At the end of the day, I don't come back to what an Afghan actually wrote to me and said, I can't thank you enough for all the opportunities, the freedoms, and the privileges that we enjoyed during the time of the US and coalition forces, commitment to our country. And so this group of the Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans of America, and thanks for your leadership, not not just a member of the board, you're the chairman of the board. You know, this is I believe that they comprise the new greatest generation of Americans. And they should stay quietly proud of what it is that they did. In Iraq and Afghanistan, of course, I was privileged to lead them in Iraq during the surge in Iraq, which just completely drew a country back from the civil war in a variety of other places. In the words of the post 911 period, the fact that they raised their hand and took an oath of service at a time of war, knowing that they're going to be asked to deploy I mean, that speaks volumes of their willingness to serve and then to reenlist. I often recall the largest we think re enlistment ceremony in history, certainly in a war zone 1215 soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Fourth of July 2008, and I was the re enlisted officer, Senator McCain, Lieberman Graham, those three centers were there. Any wonder what is this all about, and you realize that individuals feel privileged to perform a task, have a mission of consequence for our country, it's larger than cell privilege to do it with others and privilege to do it at a time when Americans even regardless of their views of the policies, we're implementing very much appreciate what it is that our men and women in uniform were doing for our country. And, and none of those can take any of that away. It can't take away what Atkins enjoyed for 20 years, it can't take away the achievements in Iraq. How are also how are we perfect, but a country at least as well, there are a variety of threats and has said peaceful transitions of power and so forth. Lots and lots of challenges. But I think that's how you have to look at this email. This is this is beyond disappointing. It's more than that. But we did when it was our country asked us to do an hour of need, and in many cases, kept doing it again, and again. And again, during the height of those war years. I think I figured out that I were 11/4 of July in my final years in uniform, eight of them, I think I was deployed. Again, that was a privilege. And I don't think you can describe in any other fashion, really the greatest privileges of a lifetime, just as I'm sure you feel about your service in VBA.

Dr. David Shulkin: 53:10

I think your dog wants you to get off the phone. So I'm just going to wrap up with one final question on these issues. Good. So So the final question just to sort of wrap this up. I think that it's unclear. It's always a little bit unclear how history is going to record these unbelievable times that we're all living through right now. But do you worry about the long lasting consequences to the US his reputation, how our allies are going to view us when in the future? We seek these Coalition's to go in and to address crises around the world? And, you know, how do you how do you think this is going to impact our ability to continue to work with other countries and their belief that when we make a commitment that we're going to stick with it?

General David Petraeus: 54:06

Well, again, I think you objectively have to acknowledge that this has been a bit of a blow to our credibility and reputation. I mean, just listen to the speeches made in the House of Commons by fellow Afghan vet Tom to the amount of good friend as well by the Minister of Defence of the UK, by other leaders of the major NATO nations, keeping in mind that of course, many of them wanted to stay. So again, you that's a reality. Got it. Now, how do we, in a sense, shore back up that credibility and that reputation? I think, to be fair to the administration, they've been very clear, and trying to explain alone, this should not indicate lack of resolve elsewhere in the world where we have absolutely core vital national security interests, which we want to pursue This administration pushing very hard in that regard, rightly, in my view, to partner with allies, and with partners around the world, to, in many cases, reversing decisions of the previous government to withdraw from the World Health Organization in the middle of a pandemic, to withdraw from the Paris Climate accord, to withdraw forces from Somalia to withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal, but obviously not back into it, but trying to negotiate. So again, clearly there is work to be done. And it's going to take a considerable amount of not just words, but deeds to demonstrate that our credibility should not be questioned, and that our reputation should be intact. But that is one of the challenges that results from this particular episode in our history.

Louis Celli: 55:55

General Petraeus, I can't thank you enough for joining us today. And this is mine. Thank you. Thank you, this podcast has been extremely helpful. And I think we'll provide the type of information not only to the veterans of the United States of America, but also to the Americans who are trying to sort through the past 20 years, and essentially, some of them are just trying to get caught up now. And I think that this will help provide a lot of that background and information. Thank you so much. Thanks for the invitation. Great to be here. Okay, thanks so much. Well, that really is all the time that we have for today. Thank you so much for joining us for this special edition of the policy that's podcast. We felt that this was critically important to get out to you as soon as possible. So join us Friday as we resume our regularly scheduled programming with Anne Marie halterman talking about art therapy. We'll see you then.

Announcer: 56:51

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